In this paper, I use data from the British Household Panel Survey and Understanding Society to investigate the social and political attitudes of cultural omnivores. I report a threefold typology of visual arts consumption that is consistent with previous research. Then by linking data across the two panel surveys, I show that cultural consumption is associated with a wide range of social attitudes, the net magnitude of which is comparable to the associations with education. Specifically, omnivores are more trusting than visual arts inactives. They hold more favourable views about the European Union, and they tend to eschew subnational identities. Omnivores are 'greener', and are more liberal on gender role and homosexuality. Although omnivores are less likely to belong to a religion, they are more likely to attend religious services, albeit infrequently. Omnivores are more politically engaged. But they are not more 'class conscious'. Nor are they particularly left-wing or right-wing on distributional issues. When asked what is important to the sense of who they are, their profession or education does not appear especially salient. But omnivores are more extrovert and open to new experiences. Taken together, these results challenge the view that omnivorousness is just a new form of distinction, and suggest a more nuanced view of the role cultural consumption plays in social stratification.
Introduction
Recent empirical research on the social stratification of cultural consumption has converged to several key findings. First, although individuals in advantaged social positions are more likely than others to consume highbrow culture, they do not have any general aversion against other cultural forms. Indeed, consumers of high-brow culture are just as likely to consume middle-brow or popular culture, leading Peterson and Simkus (1992) to describe them as cultural omnivores rather than cultural snobs (see e.g. also Peterson and Kern, 1996; van Eijck, 2001; López-Sintas and García-Álvarez, 2002; Bunting et al., 2008; Bennett et al., 2009; Chan, 2010) .
Secondly, often a majority, or at least a substantial minority, of individuals in advantaged positions do not consume high-brow culture at all. Peterson (1992, p. 248) pointed out that 'just 30% of those in the highest status group say they like classical music best and only another 6% say they like opera best. Thus, 64% of the top group do not fit the model of the aesthetically exclusive snob' (see also Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007b, pp. 7-8) .
Thirdly, cultural consumption is differentiated by age, gender, parental status and other demographic variables. It is also stratified by education, income and social status.
1 Taken together, these findings lend more support to the omnivore-univore argument (Peterson and Simkus, 1992) than to the class-culture homology argument (Bourdieu, 1984) or the individualisation argument (Bauman, 1988; Giddens, 1991) .
But who are the omnivores? A composite demographic profile can be gleaned from previous research. Cultural omnivores tend to be well-educated, of higher social status, female, living in more urbanised areas, without young children at home, and so on (see the chapters in Chan, 2010) . But beyond these socio-demographic characteristics, we know relatively little about them. To fill in this lacuna, this paper explores the subjective dimension of cultural consumption. Do omnivores and univores hold different social and political values? And do they have different personality traits? These questions are of considerable interest in themselves. But they also speak to an important but unresolved issue about the very meaning of cultural omnivorousness. Peterson and Kern (1996, p. 904) argue that although omnivorous taste 'signifies an openness to appreciate everything,' it does not mean that 'the omnivore likes everything indiscriminately.' Indeed, Bryson (1996) shows that individuals with tolerant musical taste have 'a specific pattern of exclusiveness. ' Specifically, '[t] hose genres whose fans have the least education . . . are also those most likely to be rejected by the musically tolerant' (Bryson, 1996, p. 61) . This points to an ambiguity in the meaning of cultural omnivorouness. As Chan and Goldthorpe (2007b, p. 3) observe, 'omnivores may be seen as essentially tolerant individuals . . . who have a general openness to other cultural styles . . . perhaps, a desire to experiment with different kinds of cultural consumption . . . [Alternatively,] omnivores may be seen as expressing a new aesthetics which, even if more inclusive and "cosmopolitan" than that of earlier cultural elites, is no less directed towards the demonstration of cultural and social superiority. ' Some other scholars have been more forthright and unequivocal. For example, in a study of an elite boarding school in America, Kahn (2011, p. 152 ) maintains that '[e] lites have incorporated some of the cultural attributes and tastes of those that they had previously excluded. Yet this new practice-omnivorous consumption-is itself a symbolic marker . . . this omnivorousness, become their own mark of distinction. ' Similarly, Ollivier (2008, pp. 122-123) argued that omnivorousness is 'the new "aesthetics of elite status" which replaced highbrow snobbishness as a means of class distinction' (see also Roose et al., 2012) . In other words, 'plusça change, plus c'est la même chose.' Is cultural omnivorousness a mask that conceals deeper and unchanging social and cultural snobbery, or perhaps even a ploy used by the elites to justify existing inequality.
2 By considering the way in which cultural consumption 'is embedded in larger systems of meaning ' (DiMaggio, 1996) , this paper seeks to address this core ambiguity.
Previous research on the social and political attitudes of omnivores
To the best of my knowledge, there are, until recently, only two surveys that collect information on both cultural consumption and social attitudes. As a result, there are only a handful of papers that examine the social attitudes of cultural omnivores. The two surveys are the 1993 General Social Survey (GSS) and the 2003-04 Cultural Participation in Flanders Survey. Using GSS data, Bryson (1996) reports an association between political intolerance and the number of musical genres disliked. In particular, intolerant individuals dislike more genres; and those with high racism score report 2 In an article entitled 'The New Elitists' that appeared in the New York Times on July 7th, 2012, Kahn writes that '[e]lites today must recognize that they are very much like the Gilded Age elites of old. Paradoxically the very openness and capaciousness that they so warmly embrace-their omnivorousness-help define them as culturally different from the rest. And they deploy that cultural difference to suggest that the inequality and immobility in our society is deserved rather than inherited ' (emphasis mine). more dislikes of those 'genres that are disproportionately liked by Hispanic or Black respondents' (Bryson, 1996, pp. 891-892) .
Also using GSS data, DiMaggio (1996, p. 168) shows that visitors and non-visitors of arts-museum are significantly different on 44 out of 94 items. In particular, '[a]rt-museum visitors are somewhat more secular, trusting, politically liberal, racially tolerant, and open to other cultures and lifestyles, and much more tolerant and interested in high culture than are comparable non-visitors' (DiMaggio, 1996, p. 161) . These attitudes, according to DiMaggio, suggest 'a distinctly modern disposition, evincing, first, a faith in progress and in scientific (and artistic) authority; and second, an open, cosmopolitan orientation to both people and cultures. ' More recently, using data from 2003-04 Flanders survey, van Eijck and Lievens (2008) explore the association between musical consumption and attitudes on social integration. They find that 'omnivores are rather concerned with the well-being of others. They are neither isolated nor socially disoriented, but they are not likely to be very individualistic either . . . The eclecticism and openness attributed to cultural omnivores do not seem to imply a markedly self-willed attitude ' (van Eijck and Lievens, 2008, p. 235) . Do these findings hold for the UK? Because the meaning and salience of social issues often vary across countries, we cannot answer this question with certainty prior to empirical investigation. For example, the Church of England and the evangelical churches in America are quite different in their values and politics. As a result, we might see different associations between religiosity and cultural consumption in the two countries. Furthermore, values and attitudes in different social domains might not have the same underpinnings. For example, Chan and Goldthorpe (2007a) show that it is social status, not social class, which predicts 'libertarian-authoritarian' attitudes, while the opposite is true for 'left-right' attitudes. Given the strong association between social status and cultural consumption, we might expect cultural consumption to have net association with some, but not all, social and political values. The upshot, then, is that the values, attitudes and personality traits of UK's cultural omnivores remain interesting empirical questions to be explored.
Data and analytical strategy
The data that I use come from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and Understanding Society. BHPS began in 1991 with a nationally representative sample of about 5,500 households. All members of these households and their children (when they reach the age of 16) have been followed in annual interviews in subsequent years. After 18 waves, BHPS was superseded in 2009 by a new household panel survey called Understanding Society which has a sample of about 30,000 households and over 54,000 individuals.
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Understanding Society is still a young panel survey. But since BHPS respondents have been incorporated into the sample of Understanding Society from wave 2 (2010-11), 4 there is, for this group of respondents, quite detailed information over a broad range of topics going back many years.
Wave 2 of Understanding Society contains a set of questions on cultural consumption. My strategy is to relate these data to the attitudinal measures collected in waves 1 and 2 of that survey and, for the original BHPS respondents, also to the attitudinal data in the BHPS from 2005 through 2008. A key assumption of this research strategy is that individuals' cultural consumption pattern is relatively stable, at least over the period of several years. To the extent that this assumption is unjustified, the independent variable of interest, i.e. the latent classes of cultural consumption, will have more measurment errors, and its association with social attitudes will be weaker. In other words, this approach is biased against finding statistically significant associations between cultural consumption and social attitudes. Given this, we could be more confident of the significant associations that are actually found.
Independent variable: visual arts latent classes
Our independent variable concerns cultural consumption in the visual arts. In wave 2 of Understanding Society, respondents were asked whether in the past 12 months they have been to the five types of visual arts events listed in Table 1 .
5 These indicators are very similar to those of the Arts in England survey (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2007c) or the Taking Part survey (Bunting et al., 2008) , and the levels of participation reported in these surveys are broadly comparable.
6
The binary response to these indicators form a 5-way contingency table 3 More information about BHPS and Understanding Society is available from http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/bhps and www.understandingsociety.org.uk. 4 The fieldwork of each wave of Understanding Society takes two calendar years. Thus, wave 1 took place in 2009-10, wave 2 took place in 2010-11, and so on.
5 To adjust for the complex sampling design of both BHPS and Understanding Society, all results reported in this paper are weighted.
6 The Taking Part survey has six indicators of visual arts consumption, which are the five items listed in Table 1 plus 'Craft exhibition'. The Arts of England survey contains the same visual arts consumption questsions as the Taking Part survey except the item of 'Carnival or culturally specific festivals. ' Following Chan and Goldthorpe (2007c) and Bunting et al. (2008) , I have restricted my analysis to respondents aged 20-64. with 32 (i.e. 2 5 ) cells which I analyse with latent class models. The goodness of fit statistics of these models are reported in the top panel of Table 2 . None of the models achieves a satisfactory fit with the data by the conventional criterion of 5% type I error. But given the large number of observations in the contingency table (N = 28, 657), I accept model 4 as providing an adequate summary of the data.
The bottom panel of Table 2 reports the latent class solution under model 4. It can be seen that members of the largest latent class, which accounts for 58% of the respondents, are quite inactive in the visual arts. Over a twelve months period, only one in nine (11%) had been to a museum or gallery; and one in twelve (8%) had been to a carnival. The participation rates at other visual arts events are even lower at 3% or less.
In contrast, although the smallest latent class accounts for only 13% of the sample, its members are keen consumers of the visual arts across the board. Almost all of them had visited a museum or galley (95%), or an exhibition of art, photography or sculpture (97%); more than a third (38%) had visited a video or electronic arts event; and even for non-highbrow activities, such as street arts and carnival, their participation rate is still the highest of all. Finally, there is a third group that is intermediate both in terms of its size (29% of the sample) and the level of visual arts consumption of its members.
Overall, the pattern of visual arts consumption of Understanding Society respondents is very similar to that found in previous research. Following Chan and Goldthorpe (2007c) and Bunting et al. (2008) , I label the three latent classes as inactives (I), paucivores (P) and omnivores (O) respectively (see also Alderson et al., 2007) . This threefold typology serves as the key independent variable in the analyses below. Visual arts is just one form of cultural consumption, and a threefold typology is but a small improvement over the binary contrast of 'visitors vs non-visitors' that DiMaggio (1996, p. 175) calls for.
7 But, as we will see, this typology proves to have strong associations with a wide range of social and political attitudes.
Control variables
All regression models reported below control for respondent's age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, education, household income, social class (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992) and social status (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2004) . It should be noted that the control variables are taken from the same year as the relevant dependent variable. Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics of the control variables. 7 DiMaggio (1996) uses a dichotomous independent variable: whether someone has been to an art-museum in the past 12 months or not. DiMaggio points out that despite the crude nature of this variable, the results are quite impressive. He then speculates that if art-museum visitors can be differentiated further into, say, 'art lovers', 'casual visitors', etc., more revealing patterns could be discerned. The threefold typology used in this paper is a step in that direction.
8 Because of the much larger sample size of Understanding Society and also because of oversampling of ethnic minorities, five ethnic groups could be distinguished for that 
Dependent variables: social attitudes and personality traits
The dependent variables are derived from 89 questions taken from waves 15 to 18 (2005-2008) of the BHPS and waves 1 and 2 (2009-10, 2010-11) of study, namely 'white', 'asian', 'black', 'mixed' and 'others'. For BHPS, I used the binary 'white'-'non-white' contrast.
Understanding Society. Thirty-three of the 89 items are stand-alone measures. The rest are used to form 12 additive scales and two cateogorical variables (one on political partisanship, the other on religious attendance). So altogether there are 47 dependent variables. The additive scales and those stand-alone items with likert-type response catogeries will be used as dependent variables in OLS regressions; the rest will be analysed with binary or multinomial logistic regression models. Thematically, the 47 dependent variables fall into ten domains, namely (1) risk-taking and trust, (2) the European Union, (3) national and subnational identities, (4) gender, marriage and sexuality, (5) environment and climate change, (6) faith and religion, (7) subjective social class membership, (8) political engagement and partianship, (9) sense of self, and (10) the Big Five personality traits.
Before reporting the empirical results, three general remarks are in order. First, there is no good reason to think that visual arts consumption is a general cause of social attitudes. It is more likely that cultural consumption and certain attitudes and personality traits tend to go together. So the results reported below should be interpreted as statistical associations rather than causal relationships (see also DiMaggio, 1996, p. 174) .
Secondly, due to the large number of regression models considered in this paper, the Tables below will show the estimates of only three key parameters: those for omnivores and paucivores (with inactives as the reference category) and that of university graduates (with people with no qualifications as the reference category). Since 'education is clearly the most powerful predictor' (Davis, 1982, p. 585 ) for a wide range of attitudes and behaviour (see also Hall et al., 1986; Phelan et al., 1995; Kingston et al., 2003) , the parameter for university graduates serves as a benchmark against which the omnivores and paucivores parameters are compared. Full regression results, question wordings, etc. are reported in the Appendix.
Thirdly, in evaluating the regression results, we need to consider not just whether the parameters are statistically significant, but also their substantive magnitude. To this end, I have, in addition to using the 'degree' parameter as a benchmark, standardised the dependent variables of the OLS regressions (i.e. their mean and variance are normed to equal zero and one respectively). This means that the OLS estimates can be read as fractions of standard deiviation of the relevant dependent variable. To aid the interpretation of the logit or multinomial logit parameters, I will report predicted probabilities of the outcome variables for selected combinations of education and cultural consumption. 3 Results
Risk-taking and trust
Let us start with a set of questions on risk-taking and trust. In wave 1 of Understanding Society, respondents were asked the following questions.
• 'Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?' (risk-taking)
• 'Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks in trusting strangers or do you try to avoid taking such risks?' (trust stranger)
• 'Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?' (trusting people)
For the first two questions, respondents chose an answer from a scale that ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values denoting a more risk-taking or trusting disposition. Table 4 shows that, compared to the inactives, omnivores and paucivores are significantly more likely to take risks and they are more trusting of strangers. The magnitude of these differences are quite large. For example, other things being equal, omnivores are about a quarter (.23) of a standard deviation more disposed to taking risks than inactives, while graduates are about one-sixth (.16) of a standard deviation more risktaking than people with no qualifications. As regards 'trusting strangers', both omnivores and graduates are about one third of a standard deviation more trusting than their respective reference group.
Table 4 also shows that just over one third (36%) of the respondents think that 'most people can be trusted.' However, graduates, paucivores and omnivores tend to be more trusting. 9 The magnitude of these associations can be seen from the predicted probabilities of Figure 1 : half of graduate omnivores think that most people can be trusted, compared to about one third (35%) of omnivores without qualifications, 40% of graduate inactives, and 26% of inactives without qualifications.
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The results reported in this section are consistent with those of DiMaggio (1996) in that paucivores and, especially, omnivores are more risk-taking and trusting than people who are inactive in the visual arts. But perhaps of equal importance is the finding that these associations and the associations with education are of comparable magnitude in substantive terms.
The European Union
There are interminable political debates in the UK about the European Union. Has too much power been conceded to the EU? What role should the 9 To make the prose less clunky, I sometimes drop the reference to 'inactives' and 'people without qualifications'. Readers can assume that it is in comparison to these two groups that the parameters of omnivores and paucivores, and that of graduates are discussed.
10 The predicted probabilities are computed as follows. I first assume all respondents are graduates and omnivores, while all other covariates take on their actual values. I then calculate the predicted probability of each respondent 'trusting people', and the probabilites are then averaged. That is, these are the mean of the individual predictions, not the predicted proportions evaluated at the mean of the covariates. Other combinations of education and cultural consumption and, indeed, other predicted probabilities reported below are computed in an analogous way. UK play in the EU? Or should the UK leave the EU altogether? In 2006, BHPS respondents were asked the following three questions.
• Generally speaking, do you think that Britain's/the UK's membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing or is it neither good or bad? (EU membership a good thing)
• Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Britain/the UK has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union? (UK benefit from EU)
• Do you think Britain's/the UK's long-term policy should be: (1) To leave the European Union, . . . or (5) To work for the formation of a single European govenment? (long term policy) Table 5 shows that Britons are on the whole quite sceptical about the EU: just over a third (36%) of the respondents think that EU membership is a good thing, 11 and under half (45%) think that the UK has on balance benefited from being in the EU. It also shows that omnivores, paucivores, and university graduates are more pro-EU. Figure 2 illustrates the substantive magnitude of these estimates. The left panel shows that 70% of graduate omnivores think that UK's membership in the EU is a good thing, compared to 39% of omnivores without qualifications, 47% of graduate inactives and 19% of inactives with no qualifications. A similar pattern is found for the question of whether the UK has benefited from the EU (see the right panel).
The third EU question has five response categories, with higher values representing views that favour further integration with the EU. Consistent Table 5 shows that omnivores are a third (.37) of a standard deviation more likely to support further European integration. 12 The parameters of graduates and paucivores are positive, but they fail to reach statistical significance. Overall, then, omnivores, graduates and, to a lesser extent, paucivores hold more favourable views about the EU. Euroscepticism in the UK is likely to have multiple roots. But to the extent that it reflects an insular, 'keep the foreigners at bay' mindset, the results of this section, again consistent with DiMaggio (1996) , suggest that omnivores and paucivores are more cosmopolitan in their outlook.
National, subnational and ethnic identities
British people's attitudes about the EU is partly a matter of national identity: 'just how European are we?' This suggests a tension between national and supranational identities. Similar tension might be found at the interface between the national and subnational levels. That is, Britons might identify with the UK as a whole, and/or with one of its four constituent countries: England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Given the popularity of some nationalist parties in the UK and the referendum on Scottish independence in 2014, this is a potent political issue.
In wave 1 of Understanding Society, respondents were asked 'Looking Table 6 shows that about 40% of the residents in England identify themselves as English only; just over a quarter (27%) as British; one fifth (21%) as both British and English; and one-eighth (13%) choose other categories or other combinations of categories. Table 6 also shows that subnational identities are more common in Wales, Northern Ireland and, especially, Scotland, reflecting the strength of nationalist sentiments in those parts of the UK.
Using the fourfold typologies as dependent variables in multinomial logistic regressions, Table 7 shows that, in England, graduates are more likely to identify themselves as British, British and English, or even Others rather than just English. The same holds for paucivores and omnivores. A similar pattern is seen in Wales and Scotland, with two exceptions. First, in Wales cultural consumption is unrelated to national identities. Secondly, in both Wales and Scotland the dual national and subnational identity is unrelated to both education and cultural consumption.
The result for Northern Ireland is, however, quite different in that neither education nor cultural consumption predicts national identity. This might be related to the history of violent conflict between the protestant and catholic communities there. As a result, national and subnational identities have acquired a particularly negative salience: identifying yourselves as British, Irish or Northern Irish might, for some, carry a sectarian connotation. Figure 3 illustrates the substantive magnitude of the associations. For example, the top-left panel shows that 49% of English residents identify themselves as English only if they have no qualifications and are inactive in the visual arts; compared to 33% of graduate inactives; 40% of omnivores without qualifications; and 25% of graduate omnivores.
In the previous section, we see that graduates, paucivores and omnivores are more supportive of the supranational European Union. We now see that, when asked to choose between national and subnational identities, these groupings also tend to eschew the more parochial subnational identities and go for the broader British identity. This lends further support to the view that omnivores and paucivores are more cosmopolitan in their outlook. The question of identity is also especially salient to ethnic minorities. In wave 1 of Understanding Society, all respondents with a non-'White British' father were asked: 'How important is being [father's ethnic group] to you?' In addition, members of the ethnic minority boost sample and the general Table 8 shows that graduates, paucivores and omnivores tend to attach less importance to their father's ethnic identity. They are also less likely to think that 'being British' (when considered on its own) is important. Again, these results confirm the association between omnivorousness and a more open, cosmopolitan attitude, the magnitude of which is comparable to the largest net difference by educational attainment. 
Gender, marriage and sexuality
Wave 2 of Understanding Society contains a set of five questions (see the Appendix for details) on women's role at home and in the workplace, which I use to form an additive scale on gender role, with higher values denoting more egalitarian views. Table 9 shows that graduates and omnivores are significantly more egalitarian in their gender role attitudes than their respective reference group. Moreover, the substantive magnitude of the omnivore parameter is almost twice as large as that for graduates. In the BHPS in 2008, there were four questions on marriage, divorce and cohabitation (see the Appendix for details), which I use to form an additive scale. But it turns out that neither education nor cultural consumption predicts attitudes on this issue. Closer inspection of the data suggests that this might arise from the limited variation in the dependent variable, e.g. for three of the four items that make up the scale, liberal plus neutral answers account for 90% or more of the respondents. In other words, a large majority of the respondents are quite liberal on marriage and family issues, leaving relatively little variation to be explained.
But there is also an item which says '[h]omosexual relationships are always wrong.' On this issue, Table 9 shows that education and cultural consumption are associated with more liberal attitudes. Specifically, university graduates and omnivores are about a third of a standard deviation more liberal than their respective reference group.
Environment and climate change
There are many questions on the environment and climate change in Understanding Society and the BHPS. Some of these tap view on climate change and its potential impacts. Others are about the extent to which the respon-dent is prepared to make lifestyle changes in order to minimise the risks of climate change, and so on. I use these items to form four additive scales, with higher values representing 'greener' or more environmentally friendly attitudes (see the Appendix for details). As Table 10 shows, omnivores are consistently greener than inactives, and graduates are greener than people with no qualifications. Furthermore, the magnitude of the omnivore parameter is substantial and, again, comparable to that of the degree parameter. For example, on the first item on 'environment and lifestyle', graduates and omnivores are both about one half of a standard deviation greener than their respective reference group. The paucivores parameters are all positive. But they are smaller in magnitude and are statistically significant for only two of the four scales.
There is an overwhelming consensus among climate scientists on anthropogenic climate change, a view that is endorsed by national academies of science from around the world (Anderegg et al., 2010) . Given this, it seems fair to say that many climate change sceptics are mistrustful of scientific authority. By showing that omnivores are significantly less likely to be climate change sceptics and thus, by implication, as having more trust in scientific authority, our results are again consistent with DiMaggio (1996).
Faith and religion
Britain is a fairly secular society. Table 11 shows that just under half (47%) of the respondents say that they 'belong to a religion' and only a third (34%) think that 'religious beliefs make a difference' to their lives. 13 In terms of attendance (not shown in Table 11 ), one sixth (17%) of the respondents attend religious services at least monthly; another sixth attend less often but at least once a year; two thirds (practically) never attend any religious service or would do so 'only at weddings, funerals, etc'.
Although graduates and paucivores are more likely to belong to a religion than their respective reference group, the opposite is true for omnivores. However, as the left panel of Figure 4 shows, the difference in church membership by education or cultural consumption is relatively small. At the same time, graduates, paucivores and omnivores are all more likely to think that 'religious beliefs make a difference' to their lives; and these differences are larger in substantive terms (see the right panel of Figure 4 ): 45% of graduate omnivores think that religion matters, compared to 32% of omnivores without qualifications, 38% of inactive graduates, and 26% of inactives without qualifications.
Finally, education and cultural consumption are both positively associated with attendance at religious service. But as Figure 5 illustrates, monthly attendance varies more by education than by cultural consumption. Where cultural consumption matters is over occasional attendance. For example, 22% of graduate omnivores attend religious services at least once per year, compared to 16% of graduate inactives.
In summary, omnivores are marginally less likely to belong to a religion. But religious beliefs matter to them, and they are more likely than inactives 
Subjective social class membership and left-right attitudes
In 2005, BHPS respondents were asked: 'Do you think of yourself as belonging to any particular social class?' As Table 12 shows, just over a third (36%) of the respondents reply in the affirmative, with university graduates being significantly and substantially more likely to say 'yes'. But there is no evidence that omnivores or paucivores differ from the inactives in this regard. Irrespective of their answer to the previous question, respondents were then asked to name the social class that they belong to: '(If you had to choose) which social class would you say you belong to?'
14 Just under half (46%) of the respondents call themselves middle class rather than working class.
15 As might be expected, graduates are much more likely to see themselves as middle class, as are omnivores, but not paucioves. Figure 6 shows the predicted probabilities of self-reported middle class membership: 72% of graduate omnivores, compared to 65% of graduate inactives, 47% of omnivores without qualifications, and 40% of inactives without qualifications. In relation to subjective social class membership, it seems fair to say that the association with education is stronger than that with cultural consumption. Respondents were then asked: 'In Britain/the UK today, how much do you think a person's opportunities are affected by the class into which they are born?' Two thirds of all respondents agree that the class origin of individuals affects their life chances.
16 But neither education nor cultural consumption predicts the response to this question.
Turning to wave 17 of the BHPS, there is a set of six questions that tap opinions on the distribution of wealth, public services, trade unions, etc (see the Appendix for details). I use these to form an additive scale on 'leftright' political attitudes, with higher values denoting more right-wing views. Table 12 shows that graduates and paucivores are more right-wing. But there is no evidence that omnivores and inactives differ on the left-right scale. The same pattern is found in relation to a question on income cap from wave 16 of the BHPS: 'The government should place an upper limit on the amount of money that any one person can make,' where higher values denote more right-wing views.
To recap, it is only when prompted that omnivores would say that they belong to the middle class. And although graduates and paucivores are more right-wing on inequality and distributional issues, omnivores are not different from the inactives on the left-right scale or on maximum income. But this is not to say that omnivores are oblivious to the influence of social class on life chances. Rather, they are just not different from most Britons in 
Political engagement and partianship
In wave 2 of Understanding Society, respondents were asked: 'How interested would you say you are in politics?' Table 13 shows that about four in ten (42%) of all respondents say that they are very or fairly interested in politics. It also shows that graduates, paucivores and omnivores report a higher level of interest than their respective reference group. The magnitude of these associations is quite large and can be seen from Figure 7 : almost three quarters (74%) of graduate omnivores are interested in politics, compared to about half of omnivores with no qualifications (52%) or graduate inactives (50%), and a quarter (28%) of the inactives without qualifications. Furthermore, graduates, paucivores and omnivores report a stronger sense of civic duty (this is based on an additive scale formed from six items from wave 2 of Understanding Society, see the Appendix for details) and are more likely to say that they intend to vote in the next general election. The magnitude of the omnivore parameter is, again, comparable to that of university degree. However, it is only the paucivores who are more likely to believe that their vote 'will make a difference in terms of which party wins the election in this constituency at the next general election.' Probably realistically, graduates and omnivores realise that a single vote is unlikely to alter the election outcome, even at the constituency level.
Omnivores and paucivores also differ in the political party that they sup- port. At the time of the survey, the shares of support among all respondents for the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, and other parties are 23%, 29%, 10% and 38% respectively. 17 Table 13 shows that omnivores are more likely to support Labour or the Liberal Democrats rather than the Conservatives. University graduates are more likely to support the Liberal Democrats rather than Labour or the Conservatives. Paucivores, however, seem indifferent between the three main parties, at least when compared to the inactives. Figure 8 shows how the predicted probabilities of party support vary with education and cultural consumption. The share of Labour support varies not so much by education, but by cultural consumption. Thus, 38% of graduate omnivores support Labour, as compared to 36% of omnivores without qual- 18 But paucivores like all three main parties. This suggests a degree of political ambivalence, and is consistent with their neutral stance over support for the three parties.
Sense of self
In Wave 2 of Understanding Society, respondents were asked: 'We'd like to know how important various things are to your sense of who you are. Please think about each of the following and tick the box that indicates whether it is very imporant, fairly important, not very important or not at all important to your sense of who you are.' In the analyses below, I have dichotomised the responses, contrasting the first two categories against the last two. Table 14 reveals a good deal of variation in what people think is important to their sense of who they are. Almost everyone (95%) attach importance to their family, followed by their profession, age, gender, education, ethnicity and, finally, politics which is considered important by only 30% of the respondents. Against this overall ranking, graduates, paucivores and omnivores are quite distinctive in their reply. They are significantly less likely than their respective reference group to attach importance to their family or ethnicity. But as the top panel of Figure 9 shows these differences are quite small in substantive magnitude.
Moreover, although about three quarters of respondents consider their profession or age are important parts of who they are, these two factors are not especially salient for graduates or cultural consumers. What is important to them is their politics, even though this item ranks bottom for the sample as a whole. The bottom left panel of Figure 9 shows that 44% of graduate omnivores think that their politics is important, compared to 30% of graduates inactives and 36% of omnivores without qualifications.
There is some difference between university graduates and visual arts consumers. Not surprisingly, education is especially important for graduates' sense of self, and the magnitude of this association is very large (see bottom right panel of Figure 9 ). Paucivores or omnivores, however, do not attach greater importance to education than do inactives. 
Big five personality traits
Finally, in wave 15 of the BHPS, there is a set of 15 questions that measure the Big Five personality traits (Gosling et al., 2003) . Table 15 shows that, net of other predictors in the model, paucivores and omnivores are not different from inactives on agreeableness or neuroticism. If anything, omnivores are somewhat less conscientious. But Table 15 also shows that paucivores and, especially, omnivores score significantly higher on 'extraversion' and 'openness to experience'. And these net differences are quite large in magnitude. Thus, compared to the inactives, omnivores are over a quarter (.29) of a standard deviation more extrovert and over half (.57) of a standard deviation more open to new experiences. These results are, in part, consistent with those reported by Kraaykamp and van Eijck (2005, p. 1686) who argue that '[o] penness turned out to be the most important personality determinant of media preferences and cultural particiaption . . . [pertaining to] not only highbrow activities, but also the reading of detective novels or the visiting of pop concerts.'
Summary and discussion
In this paper, I use linked data from the British Household Panel Survey and Understanding Society to explore the subjective meaning of cultural omnivorousness. It is clear that omnivores are quite distinctive in their social and political attitudes. Compared with visual arts inactives, omnivores are more trusting and risk-taking. They are also more supportive of the supranational European Union, and they tend to eschew subnational and ethnic identities, which suggests a more open and cospomolitan outlook. Omnivores are more egalitarian in their gender role attitudes, and they are more liberal on homosexuality. Omnivores are greener when it comes to the environment and climate change, suggesting that they are more trusting of scientific authority. And although omnivores are marginally less likely to belong to a religion, they are more likely to think that religion matters and are more likely to attend religious services, albeit infrequently.
These results are largely consistent with those reported by DiMaggio (1996) and others. But as this point has not been brought out clearly in previous research, it also bears repeating just how strong these associations are, especially since the estimates of the omnivore and paucivore parameters are probably biased downwards.
19 Most sociologists would probably agree with Davis (1982, p. 585) when he says that 'education is clearly the most powerful predictor' for a wide range of outcome variables. 20 In this light, it is really quite striking that the omnivore parameter and the degree parameter are of comparable magnitude.
What do these results say about the ambiguity of the meaning of cultural omnivorousness? It seems to me that the weight of the evidence leans towards the view that omnivores are relatively tolerant individuals who are generally open to other cultural styles. Quite apart from the findings in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 (on the EU, national and ethnic identities) which suggest that omnivores have a more cosmopolitan outlook, we also see from Section 3.10 that a key personality trait of omnivores is that they are more open to new experiences.
There are also evidences that are somewhat inconsistent with the competing view which says that omnivorousness is a new form of distinction which masks or even justifies existing inequality. For example, we see fromattitudes are linked to social class rather than social status, and the opposite is true for 'libertarian-authoritarian' attitudes. As there is a net association between cultural omnivorousness and social status, but not social class (Chan and Goldthorpe, 2005, 2007b,c) , it makes sense that omnivores are not related to left-right issues. In other words, cultural omnivorousness is rather orthogonal to social class in the classical Weberian sense.
Finally, I must admit that it is difficult to assess with survey data whether deep down omnivores harbour some cultural and social snobbery. But existing qualitative research suggests that this is not the case. For example, based on 30 qualitative interviews, Warde et al. (2007, p. 158) conclude that '[t]he evidence of our interviews is certainly that omnivorousness accompanies tolerance; there was no evidence of the drawing of cultural boundaries to exclude other social groups, and few indications of snobbishness when expressing personal cultural tastes.' Drawing on the same set of evidence, Bennett et al. (2009, p. 66) observe that 'those who were culturally engaged did not articulate a clear sense of cultural superiority.' Indeed, Bennett et al. (2009, pp. 70-71) 'find no one remotely corresponding to the figure of the snob . . . These observations imply dynamics [that are] different from those described by Bourdieu.' In other words, these qualitative evidences are consistent with the interpretation of the survey analysis presented above (see also Halle, 1993; Painter, 2002) .
